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Future automation and artificial intelligence technologies are expected to have a major impact 
on the labour market. Despite the growing literature in the area of automation and the risk it 
poses to employment, there is very little analysis which considers the sub-national geographical 
implications of automation risk. This paper makes a number of significant contributions to the 
existing nascent field of regional differences in the spatial distribution of the job risk of 
automation.  Firstly, we deploy the automation risk methodology developed by Frey and 
Osborne (2017) at a national level using occupational and sector data and apply a novel 
regionalisation disaggregation method to identify the proportion of jobs at risk of automation 
across the 200 towns of Ireland, which have a population of 1,500 or more using data from the 
2016 census. This provides imputed values of automation risk across Irish towns.  Secondly, 
we employ an economic geography framework to examine what types of local place 
characteristics are most likely to be associated with high risk towns while also considering 
whether the automation risk of towns has a spatial pattern across the Irish urban landscape. We 
find that the automation risk of towns is mainly explained by population differences, education 
levels, age demographics, the proportion of creative occupations in the town, town size and 
differences in the types of industries across towns. The impact of automation in Ireland is going 
to be felt far and wide, with two out of every five jobs at high risk of automation. The analysis 
found that many at high risk towns have at low risk nearby towns and many at low risk towns 
have at high risk neighbours. The analysis also found that there are also some concentrations 
of at lower risk towns and separately, concentrations of at higher risk towns. Our results 
suggest that the pattern of job risk from automation across Ireland demands policy that is not 
one size fits all, rather a localised, place-based, bottom up approach to policy intervention. 
  
1. Introduction  
 
The process of technological change displaces and replaces existing products and production 
processes and frees up resources that can be deployed elsewhere.  Schumpeter (1942) referred 
to this process as ‘creative destruction’ and one which was an ‘evolutionary process’ and an 
‘essential fact of capitalism’. Technological change is also identified, both theoretically and 
empirically as the critical driver of long run growth (Schumpeter 1942; Romer 1990; Baumol 
2002). Yet, the process of technological change, and in particular the change associated with 
job replacement, creates anxiety and angst within societies (Akst 2013; McClure 2017). 72 per 
cent of adults in the United States are worried of a future where robots and computers can do 
many human jobs (Anderson 2017). These fears surrounding automation is not a recent 
phenomenon. During the industrial revolution, many English textile workers (the Luddites) 
protested that machines and steam engines would destroy their livelihoods (McClure 2017).  
 
Keynes was concerned that technological advancement was happening faster than the creation 
of new jobs. Keynes (1933:3) famously made reference to the incidence of ‘technological 
unemployment’ as ‘unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of 
labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour’. We know today, that at 
that time, such concerns were unwarranted.  Unemployment in the United States is currently at 
its lowest rate in over fifty years. However, it is argued by some (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2012, 2014; Ford 2015; Ruta 2018; Wajcman 2017) that it may be different this time around, 
largely due to the pace of the change and the fact that today’s automation technologies are highly 
intelligent and able to learn (Ruta 2018). The worldwide annual supply of robots has trebled 
since the start of the century (OECD, 2018). Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014:11) argue that 
“there has never been a worse time to be a worker with only ‘ordinary’ skills and abilities to 
offer, because computers, robots, and other digital technologies are acquiring these skills and 
abilities at an extraordinary rate”. Future automation disruptions, like past automation 
disruptions are likely to have a disproportionate effect on people that have certain skills  
(Brookings Institute, 2019). Since the 1970’s there is also evidence of downward pressure on 
wages and declining labour shares. (Piketty 2013; Schwellnus, Kappeler, and Pionnier 2017). 
Recently, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), found a large and robust negative effect of robots on 
employment and wages.  
 
Existing estimates of how automation may impact workers are wide ranging and some predict 
extreme disruption. The most widely cited work in the empirical examination of automation by 
Frey and Osborne (2017) estimated that 47 per cent of U.S. current employment is at ‘high risk’ 
of being automated in the future. Using the same methodology, Frey and Osborne (2014), 
estimated that 35 per cent of the jobs across the UK and 30 per cent of the jobs in London were 
automatable. However, while this national figure provides context for the number of jobs at risk 
it overlooks the geography of this risk.  Indeed, despite the significant research in the area of 
automation and the risks it poses to employment, there is very little analysis which considers 
the sub-national implications of automation risk.  One significant exception is work conducted 
by the OECD (2018) which identified that the job risk variation between OECD regions is 
significant and could be as much as 36 per cent1. Given the existing disparities across regions 
within the OECD, the possible job losses due to automation could exacerbate or attenuate 
employment inequalities across regions depending upon whether it is leading or lagging regions 
                                                        
1 It is important to note that the results of Frey and Osbourne (2017) are not directly comparable with the (OECD, 
2018) results as there is a difference between the studies in the definition of automation risk and whether the risk 
is based on tasks and individual characteristics (OECD approach) or jobs (Frey and Osbourne, 2017). In any case, 
the disruption and spatial variation is stark and still likely to have a disruptive effect. 
 
which are most at risk.  Doyle and Jacobs (2018) highlight that this is also the case for Ireland 
where there are approximately two out of five jobs at risk of automation.   
 
Technological displacements created the existing world order and there is evidence that the 
concern, fear and uncertainties of what the future holds for people have recently been expressed 
at the ballot box. The spatial disparities of technological disruptions are increasingly suggested 
as the underlying drivers of electoral wins for Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron, Brexit, 
the recent extreme right-wing and left-wing populist voting patterns in Germany and the recent 
violent yellow vest protests in France (Rodríguez-Pose 2018). Frey et al. (2017)  also found 
that the support for Donald Trump was significantly higher in local labour markets more 
exposed to automation.  
 
Despite the impact automation has had on local labour markets and spatial displacement, there 
is still very little research that examines the spatial implications of future automation shocks. 
The international debate on artificial intelligence has gained significant momentum in recent 
years with the G7 ICT Ministers agreeing on the need to facilitate R&D and the adoption of 
emerging technologies including AI, and to ensure policy frameworks take into account the 
broader societal and economic implications of such technologies as they are developed (OECD 
2018). We have an idea of the impact at a national level due to Frey and Osborne’s (2017) paper 
in the U.S. and further at the county level in the U.S. (Muro et al., 2019). This work has also 
been complimented by national analysis (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn 2016) and an extended 
analysis at NUTS 2 regional level for OECD countries (OECD 2018). But given the significance 
of the political and social upheaval that can be caused by technological disruptions, the current 
literature is insufficient to inform policymaking at a disaggregated level that can assist national 
and local policymakers to make meaningful local intervention decisions across space in cities, 
towns, villages and rural areas. There is an absence of an accurate picture of the local automation 
job risk.  
 
This paper makes a number of significant contributions to the existing nascent field of regional 
differences in the spatial distribution of the job risk of automation.  Firstly, we use the same 
automation risk methodology developed by Frey and Osborne (2017) at a national level using 
occupational and sector data and apply a novel regionalisation disaggregation method to 
identify the proportion of jobs at risk of automation across the 200 towns of Ireland, which 
have a population of 1,500 or more using data from the 2016 census.  Doyle and Jacobs (2018) 
provide an analysis of automation in Ireland using national and NUTS3 regional data and this 
paper extends upon their work by considering Irish towns.  This methodology is applicable to 
any dataset which contains broad occupational classifications which can be directly mapped to 
detailed occupational classifications and could be replicated for countries across Europe or 
elsewhere to generate imputations of detailed employment risk of automation information at 
sub-national level. Secondly, in addition to imputing the employment risk of automation across 
towns we also examine what factors may explain variations in the exposure of Irish towns to 
automation. In doing so we use an economic geography framework to examine what types of 
local place characteristics are most likely to be associated with high risk towns while also 
considering whether the automation risk of towns has a spatial pattern across the Irish urban 
landscape. 
 
The next section provides a review of the existing literature on the job risk of automation and 
how this can be linked to the ongoing discussion in economic geography.  The precise data 
used and regionalisation imputation implemented are described in Sections 3 and 4 
respectively. Section 5 reports the results and the paper concludes with a conclusion and 
discussion section. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In this section we discuss two aspects of the existing literature and identify our theoretical 
rationale.  The first section discusses the impact of automation on jobs while the second section 
places this in the context of economic geography.   
 
2.1 Automation and job risk 
Humans have always developed new and superior products and production technologies to 
satisfy new wants and needs and to produce greater economic output with less human effort. 
This is what is meant broadly by technological change and it is a significant catalyst of long 
run economic growth (Schumpeter 1942; Romer 1990). In this context, the idea of 
computerisation where job automation is by means of computer-controlled equipment (Frey 
and Osbourne, 2017) is not new. New technologies (like computerisation) and new markets 
have replaced and generated new and more productive jobs and will continue to do so in the 
future (OECD, 2018). Automation technologies have a long history with inventions like the 
steam engine, electricity, and more recently with information technologies. Some automation 
developments have been more specialised.  For example: mechanized weaving looms; 
industrial robots; or automated teller machines (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018). From this 
perspective, robots have been coming for a long time.  
 
As far back as Simon (1965), the decline of routine jobs was predicted where computers were 
argued to hold the comparative advantage in “routine” rule-based activities which are easy to 
specify in computer code. Autor, Levy and Murname (2003) presented a simple theory, which 
has become referred to as the ALM model, of how the rapid adoption of computerisation by 
firms is changing the tasks performed by workers at their jobs, which in turn changes the market 
demand for human skills. For them robots (machines), are substituting ‘routine’ tasks but will 
not substitute non-routine tasks that involve problem-solving, complex social and emotional 
communication activities and tacit knowledge. Non-routine tasks that cannot be substituted by 
automation are generally complemented by it (Autor 2015). Routine tasks are tasks that follow 
explicit rules and non-routine tasks cannot be specified in a computer code (Frey and Osborne 
2017). Autor (2015) argues that the tasks that can be automatable are bounded by the limits of 
human knowledge and what he refers to as Polanyi’s paradox: Since humans “know more than 
they know they know” (i.e. know things that are difficult to explain as a matter of codified, 
programmable steps), there are limits to the substitutability of human tasks. Consequently, 
there will always be a division of ‘human tasks’ and ‘machine tasks’.  
 
Susskind and Susskind (2015) have identified key weaknesses of the theoretical ALM model 
where tasks that were considered ‘non-routine’ in the ALM task based literature have already 
become ‘routine’ due to technological changes leading to the likelihood of a more dramatic job 
displacement reality from current modern computerised technologies. Big data and artificial 
intelligence are progressing at incredible speed. The rate of the progress will largely be 
unknown, but nevertheless, Autor’s (2015) Polanyi paradox point is still valid: in that the 
progress of machine tasks is a function of human intelligence. Susskind and Susskind (2015) 
observations suggests that the findings of Frey and Osbourne (2017) who identified the scope 
of jobs that could be automatable in the future may actually occur more quickly than is largely 
accepted in parts of the literature.  Frey and Osbourne (2017) identified that 47 per cent of jobs 
in the U.S. are susceptible to automation. They argue their estimate also aligns closely to the 
extent of job displacement that has happened in the past. For instance, in 1900, 40 per cent of 
the U.S workforce was employed in agriculture. Now it is less than 2%.  
In general, the grave concern of technological unemployment has been unfounded. One of 
Kaldor’s (1961) stylised fact was the unhinging constant labour share of national income 
through time, despite significant technological disruptions in transportation, electricity and 
communications. The process of creative destruction has led to as many new jobs being created 
in new sectors and hence jobs lost were replaced with often better paid, more highly skilled 
jobs in their place. Despite the unfounded unemployment concerns of the past, it still created 
widespread disruption with a greater polarisation in jobs and incomes, as technologies (robots 
and algorithms) replaced, in particular, middle skilled people based-routines. But the concerns 
of today around new technologies are similar to the hypotheses of those from Keynes (1933) 
almost 90 years ago. Schwab (2016) in his piece on the fourth industrial revolution at the 
economic summit in Davos stated: 
‘We stand on the brink of a technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the 
way we live, work, and relate to one another. In its scale, scope, and complexity, the 
transformation will be unlike anything humankind has experienced before. We do not 
yet know just how it will unfold, but one thing is clear: the response to it must be 
integrated and comprehensive, involving all stakeholders of the global polity, from the 
public and private sectors to academia and civil society.’  
And, other rather pessimistic predictions have been voiced by Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
(2014:11)  where they expect technological progress ‘to leave behind some people, perhaps 
even a lot of people, as it races ahead’. Further Ford (2015), warns of a ‘jobless future’ where 
he argues that most jobs can be reduced to a division of routines. More recently, Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2017) found supporting evidence for pessimistic predictions. They identified that 
one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment to population ratio by about 
0.18-0.34 percentage points and wages by 0.25-0.5 per cent. There is also growing evidence 
that labour as a share of income is declining since Kaldor’s (1961) finding, with wages falling 
by over 10 per cent in Spain, Italy, South Korea and the United States since 1970 (OECD 
2018)2. 
 
2.2 The economic geography of job risk and automation 
Job displacement, job polarization and technological unemployment are often the most 
discussed adjustment concerns raised around automation and the rise of artificial intelligence. 
But an often overlooked implication and possibly a greater problem, is the displacement to 
places that has been created by technological change. The past century has seen a large 
migration of the human race from rural to urban areas. By 2050, Eurostat predicts about 80 per 
cent of the European population will be living in urban areas. 
 
Urban theorists argued that agglomerations are intellectual breeding grounds for new ideas and 
innovations (Jacobs 1969; Glaeser 1999; Marshall 1890). Urban areas and in particular, cities 
for a long time have been identified as important in explaining innovation. In particular, face-
to-face interaction and transfer of knowledge between individuals for innovation is critical 
(Porter 1985; Porter 1990; Storper and Venables 2004). Geographical proximity is critical for 
“fostering, facilitating and nurturing of flows of local knowledge, ideas and innovations” 
(McCann and Shefer, 2005: 302). In theoretical approaches to knowledge flows and innovation 
it is assumed that it is easier for knowledge to transfer over shorter distances than longer 
distances (McCann 2007), or as Glaeser at al.  (1992:1126)  put it,  ‘intellectual breakthroughs 
must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents’. Given the spikey 
distribution of prosperity around the world, between countries and within countries, the 
                                                        
2 It is important to note that there could be a number of reasons for this trend other than just automation. For 
instance, increased globalization, collective bargaining, labour standards, and unemployment levels could also 
be determinants (OECD, 2018). 
importance of ‘place’ in contributing to economic growth has been a central research topic 
(McCann and Simonen 2005).  
 
From the literature, it is apparent that urban areas therefore have an important role as creative 
and intellectual spaces. The ‘tolerant’ and ‘Bohemian’ nature (Florida 2002); the creative spill-
overs that are ‘in the air’ (Marshall 1890); the Jacobian diverse economies (Jacobs 1969); and 
the creative ‘buzz’(Storper and Venables 2004) in urban areas drive innovation and ‘swarms 
of creative clusters’ emerge in global and capital cities (Chapain et al. 2010). Florida’s thesis 
of the creative class which varies in their proportions from place to place suggests that 
innovation will also vary from place to place. Hence, the outcome is a spikey world in terms 
of economic performance. Educated, creative young people are migrating to urban areas to 
exploit higher wages and employment opportunities in favourable business environments 
(Chen and Rosenthal 2008; Moretti 2012).  Agglomerations provide an enhanced ecosystem to 
drive novel combinations of knowledge and ideas which result in sharper geographical divides 
between the world’s urban hierarchy and between urban and rural areas (Rosenthal and Strange 
2004; Organization 2009; Moretti 2012).  
 
The shift from manufacturing to predominantly service driven economies has actually made 
geography matter more resulting in increased divergence between places (Moretti 2012). There 
is strong evidence that digital technologies are resulting in greater divisions between large and 
small urban areas (Muro 2019). In general, urban areas with a more dense critical mass are 
more productive (World Bank, 2009), more innovative (Carlino et al, 2007), offer more job 
opportunities (Hendrickson, Muro, and Galston 2018) and higher wages (Wang 2016). 72 per 
cent of new jobs were created in large US cities (over 1 million) since 2013 (Whiton 2018). A 
similar trend is occurring in Ireland. 43 per cent of honours degree graduates work in Dublin 
city (authority 2019) and 60 per cent of the jobs created in Ireland in the past year were in the 
capital (CSO, 2016). But it is also not just a story of  ‘large’ versus ‘small’ and  ‘winners’ 
versus ‘losers’ – a much more complex geographical landscape is emerging with brain hubs, 
declining manufacturing cities and a number of cities that could thrive or decline (Moretti 
2012). It is suggested economic stagnation and a decline of economic and social opportunities 
in smaller cities, declining regions and rural areas was the force behind recent populist voting 
patterns in the United States (Hendrickson, Muro, and Galston 2018; Shearer 2016), in France, 
Germany and the United kingdom (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríquez-
Pose 2018). In response, many are calling for new strategies and policies to tackle the concerns 
of lagging areas (Iammarino, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper 2018; Rodríguez-Pose 2018; 
Shambaugh and Nunn). We envisage that future automation disruptions will further exacerbate 
regional and local disparities and that it is necessary to get a better understanding of the spatial 
disparities that future automation disruptions will create at the sub-national level across Ireland.  
 
3. Data 
This section discusses the construction of the data used in this paper.  It begins by defining the 
identification of which sectors are most at risk of automation based on the methodology used 
by Frey and Osborne (2017) in Section 3.1.  Section 3.2 discusses the Irish data and how this 
is used and applied to the Frey and Osborne (2017) methodology.  In Section 3.3 descriptive 
statistics of the risk of automaton are presented at the national level.   
 
3.1 Frey and Osborne (2017) methodology for identifying at risk occupations 
Frey and Osbourne (2017) used machine learning experts to assess the automatability of 70 
occupations using detailed task descriptions. Specifically, they asked the experts to assess 
whether each task for these occupations was automatable given current knowledge on 
computerisation capabilities and possibilities. They drew on data from O*Net which has 
detailed data from population surveys of 20,000 unique task descriptions and additional data 
on the skills, knowledge and abilities possessed by different occupations. They used big data 
and algorithm applications to assess automatable versus non-automatable tasks of the 70 
different occupations. This algorithm was then applied to assess the automatability of another 
632 occupations. In total, Frey and Osbourne (2017) were then able to examine a total of 702 
occupations that existed for 97 per cent of the workforce in the United States. Tasks linked to 
perception and manipulation, creativity, and social intelligence are considered to be safe from 
automation (OECD 2018). 
 
3.2 Converting Frey and Osborne (2017) US SCO codes to the Detailed Irish 
Occupational Classifications 
 
Frey and Osborne (2017) occupational classifications is based on the 2010 version of the US 
Standard Occupational Codes (SOC). The Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) bases their 
occupational classifications on the UK SOC.  The US and UK SOC are not directly comparable 
and there is no direct conversion available (this is further highlighted by Doyle and Jacobs in 
the Irish case).  Therefore, in order to convert the US codes to their UK counterparts (which 
are approximately identical to the Irish codes used by the CSO) we transform these data using 
a series of established international classifications.  This is accomplished through the use of 
the International Standard Occupational Classifications (ISOC).  The US SOCs can be 
converted using the Bureau of Labour Statistics official conversion (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2012).  The codes used in Frey and Osborne (2017) to identify those sectors at risk of 
automation are 6-digit US SOCs.  When converting these to the ISOC there is not a one to one 
match.  This is due to the ISOC codes being at a higher aggregation level.  Therefore, in some 
instances, two or more of the US SOC codes are combined into one ISOC code.  Where this 
occurs the risk of automation values from Frey and Osborne (2017) are averaged to provide an 
average risk for the aggregated occupation.   
 
Once the codes are in ISOC format it is possible to convert these ISOC codes to the UK SOC 
codes using a conversion framework developed by the Office for National Statistics (2010).  In 
doing so, again there are a small number of occupations which have more than a one for one 
match and therefore there is a need to average the probability of risk associated with these 
occupations.  It is possible, once this process has been completed, to perform an analysis of the 
risk of automation to occupations in Ireland. 
 
Regarding the exact figures obtained from the match of US SOC codes to UK SOC codes this 
paragraph provides a summary.  To begin with there are 878 US SOC codes.  However, for 
various reasons, Frey and Osborne (2017) provide risks of automation for only 702 SOC codes. 
For more on this see Frey and Osborne (2017).    Therefore, we begin the conversion process 
with a total of 702 SOC codes out of a possible 878 (no automation data is available for the 
176 SOC codes for which Frey and Osborne (2017) do not provide automation risk).  When 
these codes are converted to ISOC 2008 codes this yields a total of 245 ISOC codes.  The final 
conversion of the ISO 2008 to UK SCO 2010 yields a total of 314 occupations.  When this is 
matched with the Irish data on occupations a total of 302 of these occupations are present in 
Ireland.  However, not all have associated risk probabilities.  Therefore, our analysis begins 
with, what the CSO define as, the detailed occupational classifications for Ireland of which we 
have risk probabilities associated with 273 detailed occupations across 24 intermediate 
occupation aggregates covering, in total approximately 86% of all jobs in Ireland.3  
 
                                                        
3 Doyle and Jacobs’ (2018) undertake a similar conversion routine using what they term an ‘unofficial 
crosswalk’.  There is some variation in the results found by this paper compared with Doyle and Jacobs (2018).  
This may be due to variations in the matching process across occupations. 
3.3 Description of the Irish data 
The age old concern with automation and any technological change is technological 
unemployment (Keynes 1933) and the adjustment disruptions in the labour market. In the past 
two decades, Ireland experienced one of most substantial transitional change shifts of middle 
jobs to higher skilled jobs in the OECD. Where, 15.1 per cent of jobs in manufacturing were 
lost. During this time, the increase in high skilled jobs was 14.4 per cent, with only 0.7 per cent 
in low skilled jobs. Ireland has experienced over twice the rate of disparity to that observed in 
the US. According to the OECD (2018), over the same period, the average decline across 
OECD countries in traditional middle skilled jobs was 7.6 per cent. In turn, the increase in low 
skilled jobs was 2.3 per cent and 5.3 per cent in high skilled jobs. 
 
Having identified the occupations at risk and converting these to Irish codes we now discuss 
the availability of Irish data and the application of the Frey and Osborne (2017) methodology 
to Ireland along with the main difference in our application of this methodology which allows 
for inferences at a detailed sub-national level.   
 
We begin by describing the Irish occupation data and setting up our imputation approach to 
disaggregate the data to a sub-national level.  The most disaggregated Irish data on occupation, 
in terms of the scope of occupations, is available at a national level. This is referred to by the 
CSO as the detailed occupations classifications and covers, in our analysis, 273 occupational 
classifications.  This detailed classification is also available at Regional Authority level of 
which there are 32 in Ireland.  At these levels data is available from the Irish censuses of 2016 
on the number of people employed in each detailed occupational classification.  Therefore, the 
exposure of Ireland and the Regional Authorities to automation can be obtained by identifying 
the number of people employed across different ‘probability of an occupation being automated’ 
groupings.  The groupings used here are identical to Doyle and Jacobs (2018) where high-risk 
(>70% probability of an occupation being automated), medium risk (70-50% probability of an 
occupation being automated), and low-risk (<50% probability of an occupation being 
automated) to facilitate a comparison with their analysis.   
 
At a national level this yields Figure 1 which shows the breakdown of high, medium, and low 
risk occupations at a national level.   We observe a general U-shaped pattern where jobs in 
Ireland are mainly susceptible to high or low risk automation potential. This U-shaped pattern 
is largely in line with the findings of Frey and Osbourne (2017). However, the pattern is skewed 
in favour of a greater percentage of low risk jobs in Ireland, whereas it was skewed in favour 
of a greater percentage of high risk jobs in United States. This is in line with the finding of 
Doyle and Jacobs (2018) for Ireland also.   
 
When breaking this down by the proportion of jobs at risk in each occupation, Figure 3 shows 
the broad occupational classifications and the associated proportion of jobs in each broad 
classification at high, medium, and low risk.  Certain occupations can be seen to be entirely 
low risk while others are entirely high risk.  The areas expected (in the theoretical and empirical 
literature) to be the most resilient to automation are in the fields of education, legal and 
community services, the arts, media, healthcare, computers, engineering and science and the 
types of jobs at high risk are jobs in office and administrative support, low skilled services, 
transportation and sales related industries such as telemarketers, waiters, barmen, taxi drivers, 
accountants, tax preparation and jobs in retail. (Frey and Osborne 2017; OECD 2018). We can 
identify from Figure 2 that the occupations least and most resilient to automation in Ireland 








Figure 2: Broad Occupational Classification and Risk 
  
 
4. Regionalising the analysis 
While the national description provided in Section 3 shines some light on the employment risk 
of jobs across Ireland to automation the aim of this paper is to provide regional estimates of 
the risk of automation.  Using the actual detailed occupational data this is possible at the County 
and city level of Ireland, of which there are 32 regions available.  This analysis can be 
performed using the detailed occupational classification statistics presented and discussed in 
Section 3.   However, no further disaggregated data is available beyond this point at lower 
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spatial scales, as is consistent internationally, with only intermediate or broad measures of 
occupational classifications available.  In the Irish case occupational classifications for towns 
with a population of more than 1,500 people is only available at the intermediate occupational 
classification, of which there are only 24 available (see Figure 2 for details of these 
classifications).  The lack of availability of detailed occupational classification is not limited 
to Ireland as is common across most countries.  Therefore, this paper proposed a method to 
disaggregate the potential impact of automation to smaller regional levels.  In this section this 
methodology is discussed, and a robustness check of this approach is presented.  
 
4.1 Regionalisation methodology 
The regionalisation methodology applied in this paper is based on firstly identifying the 
automation risk for each detailed occupational classification nationally.  Once this risk has been 
identified (see Section 3 for a discussion of how this is accomplished and the results of the 
national analysis) the number of individuals in each occupational category is obtained based 
on the 2016 Irish census.  In total there are 274 detailed occupation classifications available.   
These 274 detailed occupation classifications are aggregated by the Irish CSO across 24 
intermediate occupation classifications.  These 24 intermediate occupational classifications are 
available across a far wider range of geographical and social indicators than the 274 detailed 
occupational classifications. The method of identifying the automation risk within the 24 
intermediate occupational categories can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Identify the risk probability associated with each of the detailed occupational 
classification 
2. Identify the proportion of the national workforce which is employed in each of the 
detailed occupational classifications 
3. Weight each of the risk probabilities of the detailed occupational classifications by the 
proportion of the national workforce employed in that occupation 
4. Sum the weighted risk probabilities of the detailed occupational classifications across 
the intermediate occupational classification 
 
An example of this is provided for the intermediate occupational classification ‘Corporate 
managers and directors’.  This has 15 detailed occupational classifications within it with risks 
of automation running from 0.67% to 59%.  When these are weighted by the number of 
individuals employed in each detailed occupational classification and this is then aggregated 
the intermediate occupational classification (which is comprised of these 15 detailed 




















Having calculated these 24 new risk of automation values for the intermediate occupational 
classification based on the 274 detailed occupational classifications weighted by the proportion 
of the workforce employed in each of these occupations we now turn to regionalising the risk 
of automation.  To do so we obtain the number of people employed in each of the intermediate 
occupational classifications at the lowest level of spatial aggregation available using our data.  
The lowest level of aggregation available are towns with a population of 1,500 people or more 
of which there are 200.  We then calculate the number of jobs at risk of automation by 
identifying the number of people employed in each of the intermediate occupational 
classification by the risk of automation associated with each of those intermediate occupations 
based on our constructed risk measure described in points 1 to 4 above.  In doing so we can 
generate a series of measures of the proportion of jobs at high, medium, and low risk of 
automation across the 200 towns of Ireland which have a population of 1,500 or more.      
 
4.2 Robustness check of accuracy of regionalisation methodology 
In order to assess whether our regionalisation approach works we first test it at the level of 
county and cities of which there are 32 in Ireland.  The reason for choosing this as our test bed 
is that data on detailed occupational classifications and intermediate occupational 
classifications are available at this scale.  Therefore, we can compare our imputed intermediate 
occupational risk values with the outcome of using actual detailed occupational data and access 
the accuracy of our proposed approach.   
 
We begin by presenting the results of the analysis of counties and cities of Ireland using the 
actual detailed occupational data.  This is displayed in Figure 4.  When applying our imputed 
intermediate occupational classification risk profiles we observe the regional breakdowns of 
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When comparing the analysis based on the actual detailed occupational classifications with the 
analysis from the nationally weighted intermediate occupational classifications there is a slight 
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difference in the magnitude of the risk factors.  The high-risk category is typically under 
estimated while the medium-risk category is typically over estimated.  However, the ranking 
of the regions in terms of high-risk remains robust to the alternative specifications.  The 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficient between the rankings of the detailed and intermediate 
occupational groupings for high risk is 0.9776 with an associated p-value of 0.0000.  As well 
as this the correlation between the proportion of jobs in the high-risk and low-risk categories 
across both methods is 0.9651 and 0.9696 respectively (with associated p-values of 0.0000 in 
both cases).  Medium-risk is the only category with a low correlation of 0.5765 (with an 
associated p-value of 0.0006).  The difference in the values can be explained as the detailed 
occupations classification data covers 86% of those employed (274 occupations out of 324).  
While the intermediate occupational classifications cover 100% of those employed.  It is not 
possible to identify which individuals in the intermediate occupation classifications do not have 
detailed occupational information so they cannot be excluded from our imputed analysis and 
will therefore always induce some degree of bias to our analysis.  However, as can be observed 
from the significantly high correlation coefficients the correlation between the real and imputed 
remains extremely high. However, as a robustness measure throughout all our analysis we test 
both the imputed proportion of jobs at high risk and the ranking of towns based on the imputed 
proportion of jobs at high risk. 
 
5. The impact of automation on towns in Ireland 
We now turn to the analysis of the exposure of Irish towns to automation.  In addition, we also 
identify some of the characteristics of these towns which impacts the extent to which they are 
at risk.   
 
5.1 Describing Irish Towns 
In total we analyse 200 Irish towns and cities with a population over 1,500 people.  The 
distribution of these towns across Ireland is displayed in Figure 6.  The largest cities of Dublin 
and Cork are clearly visible by their footprint with numerous smaller towns being dotted across 
the remainder of the country.   
 
Figure 6: Map of Irish Towns and Cities 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for Irish towns are presented in Table 1 below.  The average percentage 
of jobs at high risk of automation across Irish towns is 44.15%, However, there is significant 
differences in the degree to which the towns are exposed with the lowest proportion of jobs at 
risk being 26.14% and the highest being 57.79%.   
 
A number of factors are considered including proportion of the population of the town with a 
third level qualification, the population size of the town, the proportion of the workforce 
employed in creative occupations, age demographics, the unemployment rate of the town, 
industrial structure of employment in the town and the level of diversity of the population in 
the town. Descriptive statistics and all information pertaining to these variables are displayed 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable   
Proportion of Jobs at High Risk 44.15% 5.64% 
Independent variables   
Proportion with third level degree or higher 25.73% 6.35% 
Age Profile   
   Age 19 to 24 6.01% 1.46% 
   Age 25 to 44 31.29% 3.83% 
   Age 45 to 64 21.86% 2.97% 
   Age 65 plus 12.31% 4.19% 
Sector   
   Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) 1.52% 1.42% 
   Mining and quarrying (B) 0.20% 0.29% 
   Manufacturing (C) 10.84% 4.80% 
   Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D) 0.47% 0.30% 
   Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (E) 0.45% 0.27% 
   Construction (F) 4.44% 1.42% 
   Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G) 12.89% 2.06% 
   Transportation and storage (H) 3.56% 1.99% 
   Accommodation and food service activities (I) 6.35% 3.38% 
   Information and communication (J) 2.81% 1.83% 
   Financial and insurance activities (K) 2.98% 1.98% 
   Real estate activities (L) 0.33% 0.20% 
   Professional, scientific and technical activities (M) 3.75% 1.45% 
   Administrative and support service activities (N) 2.82% 0.94% 
   Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (O) 4.27% 1.44% 
   Education (P) 6.97% 2.08% 
   Human health and social work activities (Q) 9.13% 2.22% 
   Arts, entertainment and recreation (R) 1.44% 0.60% 
   Other service activities (S) 2.08% 0.49% 
Proportion Irish 84.44% 6.24% 
We begin with presenting the extent of the exposure of Irish towns to the risk of automation 
by presenting the top 10 and bottom 10 towns in Figure 7a and 7b.  Note that these figures are  
based on imputed values of occupation for towns based.  Therefore, the figures are approximate 
and for illustrative purposes. To emphasise the proportion of the workforce at high-risk of 
automation calculated is displayed for illustrative purposes.  It can be seen that the level of 
exposure of towns is wide ranging with a low of 26 per cent of the jobs in Bearna at high risk 
to a high of 58 per cent in Edgeworthstown. These figures are relative to 44 per cent average 
proportion of jobs at high risk across Irish urban areas.  At a county level, these towns span 
across more than fourteen counties (of a possible 26) and across all the four provinces in 
Ireland. Hence, the spatial exposure across the country is large. 
 

















































5.2 Clusters of Exposure 
A natural conclusion from the previous figures is that everywhere is susceptible to automation, 
with some places that will be more or less impacted than others. But, there also could be a 
greater spatial concentration of exposure across the country. Figure 7 shows the extent of 
spatial dependence between low risk and high risk towns across the country. This aspect of the 
analysis indicates that many at high risk towns have at low risk neighbours (nearby towns) and 
many at low risk towns have at high risk neighbours. 
There are also some concentrations of at lower risk towns and separately, concentrations of at 
higher risk towns. For instance, in the Dublin city region, Malahide, Skerries and Donabate are 
all at lower risk of automation. Similarly, some towns are adversely affected by being 
surrounded by towns at higher risk of automation such as Fermoy, Castlemartyr and Bandon 
(Co Cork) and Shannon and Abbeyfeale (Co Limerick). 
 
 
Figure 7: Morans I: Measure of Local Spatial Autocorrelation 
 
 
We can also identify two other patterns from the local spatial autocorrelation estimation where 
low risk towns and separately high risks towns are located in significant isolation. Some 
examples of at lower risk towns are Kinsale (Co. Cork), Westport (Co. Mayo) and Bearna (Co. 
Galway). Some examples of at higher risk towns include Edgeworthstown (Co. Longford), 
Carrick-on-Suir (Co. Tipperary) and Clones (Co. Monaghan). This analysis indicates that the 
spatial exposure has some patterns of clustering but also a spikey zig-zag pattern with many 
low risk and high towns facing isolated exposure.   
5.3 Modelling the factors which impact exposure of Irish towns to risk of automation 
In order to provide some insight into the factors which might determine the regional risk of 
automation we estimate equation (1) for the 200 Irish towns for which we have imputed job 
risk data.   
 
!"#$%&#'$(	*'+,- = /0 + /2345&#'65- + /78(5%9- + /:;'<5- + /=!>5- +
/?@(A"+#4B- + /CD&#'$(&E'#B- + F- (1) 
 
Where !"#$%&#'$(	*'+,- is the proportion of jobs in town i at high risk of automation.  As a 
robustness check this dependent variable is also replaced with a ranked variable which 
indicates the ranking of i from 1 to 200, with 1 being the highest risk and 200 being the lowest 
risk.  345&#'65- is the proportion of the workforce which is employed in a creative occupation 
in town i.   8(5%9- is the unemployment rate of town i.  ;'<5- is a series of dummy variables 
which take a value of zero or one depending upon the size of town i (the size categories used 
are displayed in Table 1).  !>5- age is a series of variables which indicates the proportion of 
the workforce in each of the age categories used (displayed in Table 1) in town i.  @(A"+#4B- 
is a series of variables which indicates the proportion of the workforce employed in each 
industry (the industries used are displayed in Table 1) in town i.  D&#'$(&E'#B- is the proportion 
of Irish individuals living in town i.  The / values are the coefficients of the model and F- is 
the error term. 
 
When estimating the model a series of alternative estimation techniques are applied, to ensure 
the robustness of the results obtained to alternative estimators.  We begin by estimating 
equation (1) using an OLS regression model with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroscedasticity.  Secondly, in order to account for potential spatial correlation we also run 
an estimation (1) using a spatial autoregressive estimator. As a further robustness check, to 
ensure that the results are not biased by our use of the imputed proportion of jobs at risk. We 
also estimate the model using an ordered probit estimator where the dependent variable is the 
rank of the risk of automation.  Finally, as endogeneity is a potential problem we also estimate 
the model using an instrumental variable general method of moments estimator.  In doing so 
we need to identify suitable instruments to include.  As the number of instruments available is 
limited we generate artificial instruments through the application of Bartlett’s three group 
method.  This approach orders the variables from lowest to highest and generates an instrument 
which takes a value of -1 for the bottom third of the data, 0 for the middle third of the data, and 
1 for the top third of the data.  It is important to note that while this method of generating 
synthetic instruments has been used extensively in the economic geography literature it does 
not remove the problem of endogeneity, it merely reduces it.   Therefore, we are still cautious 
in interpreting our results, focusing on the identification of associations between the variables 
as opposed to true causal relationships.   
 
5.4 The factors determining the exposure of Irish towns to risk of automation 
In this section, we discuss the factors which impact the exposure of Irish towns to automation.  
Of course, there is an endogeneity (chicken and egg) concern with models like this and there 
is subsequent uncertainty around causal determination. Nevertheless, associated relations can 
be identified and provide a rich description of the key areas of concern for future policymaking. 
The results of the  regression analysis are presented in Table 24.  In Column (1) the OLS 
estimation with robust standard errors is presented.  Column (2) presents the spatial 
autoregressive estimation.  Column (3) presents the ordered probit estimation.  Finally, Column 
                                                        
4 Our model indicates that there is spatial autocorrelation between the automation exposure of towns and our 
model is significant and has a very high R-squared at 93 per cent. VIF tests and correlation matrices indicate that 
there are no multicollinearity concerns in the underlying data.  
(4) presents the instrumental variables estimation.  We note in relation to the instrumental 
variable estimation that a test of the exogeneity of the independent variables confirms that the 
variables are exogenous.  Therefore, we do not comment on these results as in this case the 
OLS estimates are deemed to be more efficient and the sacrifice in efficiency by using an 
instrumental-variables estimator can be significant. 
 
We find some interesting results in relation to critical mass. Towns with a population less than 
5,000 people and greater than 10,000 people are less exposed to automation. This suggests that 
mid-sized towns may not benefit from the critical mass required to be less exposed and perhaps 
are not niche enough to have the benefit from being small and distinct. We will elaborate further 
on this finding in the next section. Not surprisingly we find a significantly large marginal value 
associated with the proportion of third level graduates in a town. Towns endowed with a more 
educated workforce are less susceptible to automation. It would be expected that places 
endowed with a greater proportion of educated workers are more likely to create and attract 
more highly skilled businesses and jobs that will be less exposed to automation. This is 
complimented by a greater proportion of creative occupations also significantly reducing 
automation exposure. It is not surprising that creative occupations are particularly resilient to 
automation. They have been identified as a crucial pillar for the resilience of economies in the 
face of impending technological disruption (NESTA, 2015).  
 
Places with younger populations are also less exposed to automation5. The most dramatic 
pattern often described in more peripheral areas is the hallowing out and flight of young talent 
from more remote areas. The OECD previously highlighted that poor graduate retention and 
consequent brain drain is a particularly problem in the Border Midlands and Western region 
(OECD, 2017). It can be identified from the results that industrial structure is a key determinant 
of automation risk. The results correspond to the patterns illustrated in Figure 3 and they also 
correspond to other findings in the literature (OECD, 2018; Frey and Osborne, 2017).  
 
There is an exposure hierarchy associated with places that have certain industries and more 
vulnerable sectors. Places with a greater proportion of employment in mining and quarrying 
(relative to manufacturing) are the least exposed to automation. This is followed by the arts, 
entertainment and recreation sector (relative to manufacturing), which aligns closely with the 
creative occupation effect, previously, reported here. Areas with significant employment in 
transport and storage, health and support services, public administration and defence, 
accommodation and food related services, construction and wholesale and retail trade related 
jobs are also less exposed to automation, relative to areas more exposed to a manufacturing 
industrial base. Towns with a greater proportion of employment in agriculture are more 
susceptible to automation, relative to areas more exposed to manufacturing. Surprisingly, 
places with higher unemployment are less exposed. This may be a signal that some places are 
already struggling with previous automation disruptions and are in a transition phase and are 
in effect less exposed to future automation as they are already dealing with past automation 





                                                        
5 When the reference category is expanded to include the proportion of 19-24 year olds, the results remain 
robust, where the coefficients on the higher age categories remain positive and significant. 
 
Table 2: Determinant of automation exposure of towns at high risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Model SAR Model O. Probit IV Model 
     
Unemployment Rate -0.115** -0.114** -7.506** -0.128 
 (0.0521) (0.0467) (3.196) (0.143) 
Creative Occupations -21.30*** -20.71*** -1,397*** -47.58** 
 (6.769) (6.312) (472.2) (21.74) 
Population 5,000 to 9,999 0.00754** 0.00748** 0.544*** 0.0185** 
 (0.00296) (0.00308) (0.201) (0.00841) 
Population 10,000 to 49,999 0.00394 0.00315 0.319 0.00860 
 (0.00373) (0.00374) (0.257) (0.0102) 
Population >=50,000 0.00512 0.00403 0.306 -0.0135 
 (0.00887) (0.00866) (0.568) (0.0430) 
Third Level Education -0.538*** -0.547*** -36.23*** -0.537** 
 (0.0903) (0.0715) (5.725) (0.241) 
Proportion aged 19 to 24 0.237** 0.294*** 16.57*** 0.187 
 (0.0964) (0.103) (6.106) (0.282) 
Proportion aged 25 to 44 0.352*** 0.364*** 24.25*** 0.363 
 (0.103) (0.0857) (6.547) (0.236) 
Proportion aged 45 to 64 0.281*** 0.290*** 18.46*** 0.222 
 (0.102) (0.0890) (6.593) (0.226) 
Proportion aged 65 plus 0.129** 0.131** 9.705*** 0.0650 
 (0.0587) (0.0538) (3.762) (0.112) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) 0.232*** 0.215** 15.14*** 0.363 
 (0.0847) (0.0925) (5.516) (0.304) 
Mining and quarrying (B) -1.262*** -1.183*** -82.63*** -0.706 
 (0.412) (0.388) (27.29) (0.913) 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D) -0.820 -0.756* -52.97 -1.620** 
 (0.512) (0.398) (34.08) (0.732) 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (E) -0.467 -0.474 -29.87 -0.571 
 (0.507) (0.439) (32.45) (0.728) 
Construction (F) -0.268*** -0.214** -17.59*** -0.504** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (6.447) (0.231) 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G) -0.137** -0.113* -8.620* -0.295** 
 (0.0674) (0.0659) (4.492) (0.139) 
Transportation and storage (H) -0.455*** -0.390*** -28.51*** -0.626** 
 (0.0995) (0.0979) (6.699) (0.311) 
Accommodation and food service activities (I) -0.293*** -0.297*** -19.14*** -0.257** 
 (0.0581) (0.0482) (4.016) (0.126) 
Information and communication (J) -0.185 -0.123 -13.26 0.626 
 (0.171) (0.162) (10.98) (0.582) 
Financial and insurance activities (K) -0.0109 0.0525 -1.036 -0.0611 
 (0.113) (0.0979) (7.274) (0.183) 
Real estate activities (L) 0.831 0.926 51.18 1.091 
 (0.768) (0.712) (51.09) (1.320) 
Professional, scientific and technical activities (M) -0.318 -0.299* -21.89* -0.0501 
 (0.200) (0.178) (13.13) (0.394) 
Administrative and support service activities (N) 0.388* 0.427** 24.52* 0.279 
 (0.199) (0.168) (12.60) (0.315) 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (O) -0.366*** -0.353*** -26.86*** -0.524*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0924) (6.357) (0.192) 
Education (P) -0.177 -0.183* -10.83 -0.240 
 (0.111) (0.0973) (7.205) (0.286) 
Human health and social work activities (Q) -0.145** -0.121* -9.941** -0.0504 
 (0.0698) (0.0638) (4.530) (0.130) 
Arts, entertainment and recreation (R) -0.629** -0.535** -48.19*** 0.216 
 (0.281) (0.255) (17.54) (0.569) 
Other service activities (S) -0.253 -0.242 -12.45 0.136 
 (0.289) (0.253) (18.78) (0.439) 
Proportion Irish 0.0100 -0.00398 0.941 0.0129 
 (0.0309) (0.0306) (1.867) (0.0943) 
   (4.270)  
WY  0.354*   
  (0.197)   
Constant 0.559*** 0.390***  0.619*** 
 (0.0669) (0.111)  (0.183) 
     
Observations 200 200 200 200 
R-squared 0.931   0.905 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Persistent poverty, economic decline, and limited opportunities are the fundamental drivers of 
considerable discontent in declining and lagging-behind areas around the world which have 
become expressed in recent voting decisions in the Brexit referendum, and in the American 
and European elections (Rodríguez-Pose 2018). The motivation for this paper was driven by 
those recent developments and the need to identify the significant local effects of automation 
disruptions that will happen in places across Ireland. How can we shape their future and avoid 
future geographies of discontent across Ireland?  
 
Our findings conclude a hierarchy of spatial disparities which in summary include: (1) high 
risk towns near high risk towns; (2) isolated high risk towns; (3) isolated low risk towns and 
(4) low risk towns near low risk towns. These spatial concerns complicate policy options, 
because it would not be suitable to have a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Clearly, not only do 
many towns have different levels of automation exposure; their favourable or unfavourable 
spatial exposure in surrounding and nearby towns could also hinder their long run development. 
Consequently, there is a need to consider regional and local coordination strategies across 
towns. However, a distinction should be made for towns very exposed to automation that are 
beyond the city-regions in Ireland i.e. rural areas/urban towns in city regions have different 
concerns to more remote and peripherally located urban towns and rural areas. The latter face 
the biggest automation risk and future growth challenges. We would argue  these areas need a 
different policy approach.  
 
In addition to coordinated regional and local strategies, there is also a need for coordinated 
sector strategies built upon local strengths. It is clear from the results that industry exposure is 
critical in determining automation exposure. In particular, towns exposed to agriculture and 
manufacturing should be key concerns as they are likely to be the towns most disrupted by 
future automation. Smart specialisation strategies and place-based policies (da Rosa Pires et al. 
2014)  should prove to be a useful policy framework to use in this context. For example, many 
towns in rural areas in Ireland are highly dependent on agriculture. It is an embedded rural 
industry with significant local specialised knowledge competencies. Even though many jobs 
will be automated in agriculture, the ability of towns to leverage from this local knowledge 
base to create higher added value jobs in related areas will be critical to unlocking untapped 
potential. Agriculture is closely tied to food innovation, tourism innovation and synergies with 
the creative industries. The areas of agri-food innovation, tourism and the creative industries 
are also less exposed to automation as indicated in our results. The creative industries and 
creative occupations have been identified globally as important contributors to the local and 
regional economies in rural areas (OECD 2013) leading to creative regions (Scott 2010). The 
creative industries can be an important catalyst of innovation in rural towns, with spill-overs 
across many different sectors and they sit at the heart of inclusive, equitable, and sustainable 
growth and development.   
 
Finally, we have discussed the need for coordinated regional strategies and coordinated sector 
strategies, but it is also evident from the results that local town place specific factors are driving 
automation risk. For instance, education levels, age demographics and town size are key issues. 
Hence, key barriers to unlocking local competencies in peripheral towns will be to curb the 
brain drain by making skills development and education more financially accessible and 
remotely possible. Local people will need to respond and drive new social entrepreneurial 
solutions to tackle the locational challenges as the people in these places are best placed to 
identify the bottlenecks and problems. In fact, such a model has recently happened 
spontaneously ‘from the grassroots’ in peripheral locations in Ireland, which have become 
known as ‘digital hubs’. One such example is the Ludgate Hub in Skibbereen which is 
attempting to bridge the digital divide between urban and rural areas. If such hubs are supported 
by nearby regional universities it may help rural areas unlock untapped potential. This bottom-
up social-entrepreneurial led initiative may be well placed to successfully help unlock potential 
in the region. However, one of the trends internationally for successful cities is the presence of 
successful universities. If universities play a critical role in successful urban development, then 
they will also need to play a critical role in successful rural development. The ability of regional 
universities to become more accessible to peripheral communities and to expand their reach to 
directly support place-based policies such as supporting digital hubs in expanding their delivery 
of training and education will be critical to the future of remote towns and regions. 
 
It should be noted that the analysis is based on regionally imputed values for towns and covers 
approximately 86% of jobs in Ireland with the remaining 14% of jobs being in occupations in 
which there was no data available for automation risk.  More precise data on occupations would 
enable a more detailed analysis of automation risk across Irish regions.  These results show 
how imputation of data for regional analysis of automation risk is possible.   
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